The Academy's Finances In Pictures

By now you have heard that the Academy of Natural Sciences' (ANS) public-facing museum is closing at the end of September 2026. This has caused a public outcry, with “Save the Museum” campaigns, “turn-ins” where everyone pledges to visit, an outpouring of memories about how important the museum was, and is, to people. I haven't been to the museum, but I was curious how it happened so I can watch for it at museums I work with.

Nonprofit organizations file Form 990s annually. I analyzed them starting with the Drexel and ANS 2011 affiliation agreement and wrote a deep-dive version of this document that lacked graphics (I'm a raw data lad). Many asked me to “make it simpler and more visual." This is my attempt to simplify and explain via charts what the Form 990s looked like to me.

The public filings show ANS’ long-running financial dependence on Drexel, years-long very thin year-end operating cash, and a sharp decline in signed, unpaid unconditional pledges, aka "pledge pipeline." 

In FY2025, the Academy reported $23.007 million of operating expenses. Operating revenue other than Drexel supplied $14.114 million; Drexel supplied $8.288 million; and $605,000 remained uncovered. At June 30, operating cash was $203,000, while the current-use liquidity measure was $1.46 million. 

The financial troubles predated COVID, and membership has been flat since COVID. Those two variables suggest a structural funding problem, and that isn't easy to fix.

Side note: The Academy, with its nearly 20 million objects and active research, education, and public-engagement missions, is not closing. At least not yet. That is a separate worry for me, but now that Drexel and the city and state officials are engaged, I am cautiously optimistic about a positive outcome on the non-public-facing front.

Who covered the FY2025 operating costs?

The Academy generated $14.114 million of operating revenue excluding Drexel. Drexel added $8.288 million. The remaining operating deficit was $605,000.

This makes Drexel's share of operating expenses 36%, meaning Drexel supplied 36 cents of every operating-expense dollar. Despite that contribution, the Academy still reported a $605,000 operating deficit. 

Operating costs. Source: Academy FY2025 audited financial statements

A long-running accumulated deficit

By June 2019, the accumulated unrestricted operating-deficit balance was $21.379 million below zero. It worsened by $3.255 million in FY2020, the first pandemic fiscal year, then the accumulated deficit improved after FY2020, but the annual drivers differed. The financial statements include operating results, investment activity, pension changes, restricted funds, and other non-operating items. This chart does not establish a single cause for each year’s movement.

The graph starts in FY2016 and indicates the problems predated COVID. For example, the deficit worsens by 61% from FY2016 to FY2019. The balance was $21.4 million below zero by June 2019 and hit its lowest, $24.6 million below zero, in FY2020. It improved to $19.1 million below zero by FY2025. 

This is a cumulative balance-sheet measure, beginning in FY2016 and using the same reported balance definition throughout.  Academy audited statements, FY2016–FY2025.

What unpaid pledges do and do not tell us

Net contributions receivable fell from $4.609 million in FY2015 to $333,000 in FY2025, a 93% decline. The path was not linear, as the balance increased in FY2017, FY2021, and FY2023.

The chart shows a much smaller year-end balance of signed, unpaid unconditional promises. It does not measure total donations, conditional commitments, planned gifts, or the Academy’s full fundraising pipeline. The filings also do not establish whether the remaining $333,000 was designated for endowment. The increases in FY2017, FY2021, and FY2023 may reflect specific campaigns, large pledges, collection timing, or other factors that year-end balances alone cannot determine.

This is a much smaller balance of signed, unpaid unconditional promises at year-end. It is not total giving, the full fundraising pipeline, or a measure of donor enthusiasm. The filings also do not establish whether the FY2025 balance was intended for endowment.

This balance is signed, unpaid, unconditional promises at year-end. It is not the full fundraising pipeline and does not identify which pledges were for endowment. Academy audited statements, FY2015–FY2025.

The checking-account concern

Operating cash peaked (at least for the numbers presented here) at $9.484 million in FY2017 and ended FY2025 at $203,000. FY2025 audited expenses averaged about $63,033 per day. Dividing $203,000 by that average daily expense gives an equivalent of 3.2 days of average FY2025 expenses. 

However, the audit reported $1.46 million of financial assets available for current use within one year and a $5 million Drexel line of credit, of which $2.408 million was drawn. That provides about 64 days of expenses.

Operating cash is a June 30 snapshot. The FY2025 audit separately reported $1.46 million of financial assets available for current use within one year. Academy audited statements, FY2017–FY2025.

Endowment grew

The endowment rose from $48.639 million in FY2013 to $78.252 million in FY2025. Converting the FY2013 balance to June 2025 dollars produces about $67.189 million, so the ending balance was higher in real terms before accounting for the timing of later gifts. The difference is $11.1 million in real terms before accounting for the endowment gifts received during the intervening years.

However, $14.171 million of nominal new endowment gifts was added from FY2014 through FY2025. Because those gifts arrived at different times, comparing their nominal total with the inflation-adjusted change in the endowment is only a rough indicator. It suggests that the earlier principal did not clearly preserve its purchasing power after spending and inflation, but it does not establish a precise 7% loss. Most of the endowment principal is donor-restricted and therefore is not freely available to cover a general operating deficit. However, payout from donor-restricted endowment funds can support the specific operating purposes allowed by the donors.

Drexel's May 2011 affiliation announcement described a “rock-solid balance sheet with a $51 million endowment.” That figure predates the FY2013 audited balance used in this chart and may reflect a different measurement date or presentation basis. The approximately $2.4 million difference therefore should not be treated as a documented loss caused by the affiliation.

The board-set spending-policy rate is important (what it functionally means I moved to the Appendix). It moved from 6.5% to 5.5%, then 6%, and to 7% from FY2021 onward. The FY2025 payout was $4.221 million. A higher rate can support today's budget but increases long-term pressure; sustainability depends on returns, inflation, fees, new gifts, and donor restrictions.

The $60.3M is implied, as I back-computed it from the payout, as I didn't see it in the audit.

The 7% is applied to a trailing seven-year average, not the June 30 balance. The FY2025 payout of $4.221 million implies a valuation base of about $60.3 million. Applying 7% to the FY2025 closing balance of $78.252 million would produce $5.478 million, which was not the reported payout. A 7% policy is not a 7% annual reduction in the fund, and the payout lags the market in both directions.

New endowment gifts totaled $14.2 million in nominal dollars during FY2014–FY2025. The 7% policy rate is applied to a trailing seven-year average, not the current balance. Academy audited statements; BLS CPI-U; NACUBO context.

Admissions revenue mattered, but they were not the whole museum economy 

Admissions revenue was $1.539 million in FY2014 and $1.259 million in FY2025. The FY2025 amount was 18% lower in nominal dollars and about 40% lower after converting FY2014 to June 2025 dollars. Admissions revenue was lower in FY2025 than in FY2014, especially after inflation. Because the filings do not report visitor counts, this chart cannot confirm or refute claims about changes in museum attendance.

The Form 990's broader public-education program reported $3.048 million of revenue and $7.684 million of expenses, a $4.636 million difference. The program needed support beyond its directly reported revenue. It does not prove that the museum, by itself, never covered its costs in any year, as museums are commonly financed by a mix of admissions, memberships, philanthropy, endowment payouts, grants, sponsorships, and institutional or public support, not tickets alone. However, the overall financial picture doesn’t look great.

A separate operational warning came in late 2025. On September 26, the Academy announced that public hours would be reduced to Friday through Sunday as of October 1. The museum closed October 1 and 2 and reopened to the public on Friday, October 3. An internal memo reported by CBS Philadelphia said the museum eliminated eleven positions and changed the hours or scope of three others.

FY2014 admissions were $1.539 million, making the reported FY2025 amount 18% lower in nominal dollars and about 40% lower in June 2025 dollars. The $4.64 million program difference is a one-year program-service figure. Academy audited statements and FY2025 Form 990. 

Why $110 million of assets was not $110 million of cash

The Academy reported $110.212 million in total assets as of June 30, 2025. The same audit's liquidity schedule identified only $1.46 million as financial assets available for current use within one year. Most of the balance sheet consisted of investments, beneficial interests in trusts, retirement assets, property, or assets subject to restrictions or timing limits. Meanwhile, liabilities totaled $4.133 million, including a $2.408 million Drexel line of credit.

The Academy was not debt-free: it had $4.13 million of total liabilities, including a $2.408 million Drexel line of credit. However, it had no disclosed mortgage or bond debt. Academy FY2025 audited financial statements.

What the capital-spending chart can support

In FY2024 and FY2025, purchases of buildings and equipment equaled 24% and 17% of depreciation. That suggests recent capital additions were small relative to the annual accounting charge. Depreciation is not a maintenance budget; ordinary repairs may be expensed, and the fixed-asset note includes equipment, software, and library books as well as the building. A facilities assessment or capital plan is needed to make better assessments.

Depreciation is an accounting allocation. The fixed-asset category includes buildings, equipment, software, and library books; ordinary repairs and maintenance are generally expensed elsewhere. Source: Academy FY2025 audited statements.

Rescue arithmetic

What replacing Drexel would take

If Drexel's support ended and nothing else changed, the Academy would need to cover two things: the $8.288 million Drexel supplied in FY2025 and the $605,000 that was still uncovered. In this static exercise, that is a recurring gap of $8.893 million a year. I will assume FY2025 cost and revenue levels, no program reductions, and no new earned revenue.

Turning a recurring gap into an endowment figure requires a spending assumption, and the Academy's 7% policy rate of $8.893 million implies about $127 million. At 5% it implies $178 million, and at 4.5% it implies $198 million.

A second problem is that the gap would have to be covered by unrestricted endowment. In FY2025, 97.9% of the Academy's $78.252 million endowment was donor-restricted and 2.1%, roughly $1.6 million, was board-designated. Replacing Drexel would therefore require between two and three times the entire existing endowment.

The Parkway building carries deferred maintenance, but I found no figures for how much that could be. I  added a $15 to $25 million allowance; however, that is a placeholder figure, one that I would vastly prefer to replace with a real condition assessment

At a 5% or 4.5% spending assumption, that recurring gap implies $178–$198 million of additional endowment whose payout is available for general operations. I added a $15–$25 million facility allowance, which produces $193–$223 million. The facility allowance is not an audited condition estimate. Author calculations from the Academy FY2025 audit.

Payroll, endowments, grants, interest

The FY2025 Form 990 reported $1.471 million as compensation for current officers, directors, trustees, and key employees. That is 16.5% of the modeled $8.893 million recurring gap. The Association of Art Museum Directors published a survey in 2023; two-thirds of art museums spent between 41-60% of their budget on payroll. Salaries and benefits totaled $11.925 million, approximately 51.8% of FY2025 audited operating expenses.

The Academy also reported $3.825 million of grants and contracts, a $4.221 million endowment payout, and $38,000 of interest expense. The line of credit carried a 2% annual rate. Its balance was $3.5 million on June 30, 2024, and $2.408 million on June 30, 2025, after $1.092 million of net repayments. The agreement also required the balance to remain at zero for one consecutive 30-day period. Because the audit does not disclose the daily balance history, dividing $38,000 by the June 30 balance does not calculate the effective annual rate or establish that the borrowing began partway through the year. 

These figures give scale to the problem and should not be considered interchangeable savings options. Grants and endowment spending were already counted as revenue.

The public filings, though they don't show me the exact specifics of the problems, do raise governance questions: what alternatives were tested, what unrestricted funding was pursued, what capital needs were documented, and how leaders balanced today's operations against future collections care.

These are reference amounts, not a “savings menu.” The $38,000 interest figure reflects a contractual 2% rate applied to outstanding advances during the year; the $2.408 million balance is only the June 30 snapshot. Academy FY2025 audit and Form 990.

The timeline and what continues

Years of accumulated deficit, falling year-end cash, and lower unpaid pledge balances, combined with Drexel’s own operating costs, I suspect, impacted the decision to close the museum.

The public museum had already cut its public schedule to Friday through Sunday as of October 1, 2025, and eliminated 11 positions. The museum added Thursdays back in July and August 2026 for the Dino-Mite Summer program.

The September 2026 decision closes the public museum, not the Academy. Drexel and Academy leaders say the collections, research, education, and public engagement will continue. The September 1 announcement described the Parkway building as continuing to house collections and laboratories while leaders considered options. Reporting since then points toward relocation, which I wondered whether they had explored in my longer blog.

The timeline separates financial and operational milestones from the 2026 closure announcement. The 2025 hours change was announced September 26, 2025, and took effect October 1. Academy and Drexel audits; 2025 hours and staffing report; September 2026 announcements.

What the filings show

The filings support

•    A structural reliance on Drexel support in FY2025.

•    Thin year-end operating cash and limited current-use liquidity.

•    A 93% overall decline in net unconditional pledges receivable since FY2015.

•    A 7% endowment spending-policy rate applied to a trailing seven-year average.

•    Capital purchases well below depreciation in FY2024 and FY2025.

•    A parent university that itself reported sizable operating deficits in FY2024 and FY2025.

•    The deficit was in place long before COVID

What’s next?

Who will govern the Academy? Can they find a new partner altogether (I believe they have that option)? How will donor restrictions be honored? Where will collections be housed if they choose to sell the real estate? How will researchers gain access to the collections? How will the public see the specimens? 

Leadership is now in transition. Scott Cooper stepped down immediately as the Academy's president and CEO and remains involved as an adviser. On September 2, 2026, Drexel and the Academy announced that the City of Philadelphia had loaned Deputy Mayor Patricia "Trish" Wellenbach to serve as Senior Advisor until longer-term leadership is confirmed. She remains a City employee and receives no compensation from Drexel or the Academy, and she leads temporarily while the two boards search for an interim leader.

Governance itself is also moving. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on September 2 that Drexel and the Academy had reached a tentative agreement to continue the affiliation and maintain Drexel's financial support, with the university gaining control over major decision-making. You’ll note in my long-form blog that I pointed out that Drexel had no day-to-day control. Ambassador David L. Cohen is helping broker the arrangement at Governor Shapiro's request. These are tentative agreements but seem to involve a heavy governmental role. I believe a future public museum may require sustained public support, although no public funding package has been announced.

The Inquirer reported that a “source close to the talks” said that the goal is to relocate the collections and sell the 1876 Parkway building, which carries substantial deferred maintenance. Cohen has said publicly that the Parkway site will be vacated and that a smaller museum could return elsewhere.

I suspect there will be a clamor about how this was always about selling the building for cash. I’m not so cynical simply because the financials have been in an unhappy place since 2011 (and earlier? What drove the affiliation to begin with?). Is selling a classic building more or less palatable than selling a few fossils (providing the Academy had "top tier" fossils to sell that would make a financial impact)?

I think the public should demand a written collections-care plan; researcher access and loan policies; a public-display strategy; clarity on governance and title; and financial reporting that separates collection stewardship, research, and public engagement. My concern is the next news cycle will arise before true change is implemented. 

Sources and methods

The main financial sources are the Academy's audited statements, FY2014–FY2025, the FY2025 audit, the FY2025 Form 990, and Drexel's FY2025 consolidated statements. Closure info comes from the September 1, 2026 Academy/Drexel announcement and the Philadelphia Inquirer. The September 2025 change in hours and staffing comes from CBS Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Inquirer report of September 26, 2025. The September 2026 leadership transition comes from Drexel's official announcement. The tentative affiliation agreement, the relocation, and the building-sale reporting come from the Philadelphia Inquirer report of September 2, 2026. Inflation uses the BLS CPI-U historical table.  

Appendix

What the 7% spending policy actually means

In practical terms, a 7% rule authorizes a $7 annual payout for every $100 in that trailing-average base. A 4% rule would authorize $4. The extra $3 supports current operations, but it also raises the investment-return hurdle needed to maintain purchasing power after inflation, fees, and distributions.

Brian Curtice 9/6/2026 7 hrs

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