The Academy of Natural Sciences - A Financial Peek

The Financials Behind Why It Could Not Be Saved
The death spiral and the arithmetic of resurrection of the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia 

Quick Background

I study sauropod dinosaurs, mostly diplodocid tails, out of the Arizona Museum of Natural History. I also run FossilCrates.com, a cast-selling company, and ExpressExhibits.com, a traveling exhibit and museum consultation business that focuses on rotating spaces, gallery revisions, and blank-sheet design. I visit 75+ museums globally each year, from one-room venues to the largest of the largest, on my quest to see all sauropod bones. And to see how each museum handles its displays, uses technology, etc. 

I wrote this blog because I was curious how we arrived at the Academy of Natural Sciences (ANS) in Philadelphia closing September 30th, 2026 [we'll see what happens with the non-binding agreement, as the ANS could seek another partner entirely]. A larger-sized museum doesn't go out of business overnight (barring disasters). And unless it is for-profit, it publishes a tremendous amount of financial data each year that can be analyzed. And that's what I did below. As a heads up, this is a long blog full of numbers, and I am not a finance expert, just a lad who sees patterns.

Alas, I have never visited the Academy of Natural Sciences (ANS) in Philadelphia. I saw the Suuwassea bones at Penn. I hoped to visit in early October, but it appears I will be a week too late, as they announced they are closing September 30th. A storied venue with ties to the earliest days of dinosaur paleontology, and apparently a beloved venue in Philadelphia, the announcement resulted in an outpouring of rage and grief. How could this happen? How could they do this? Why? What follows is my reading of audited financials. Again, I am not a financier or an accountant, so I may be missing some nuances. However, once you familiarize yourself with the reports (they are standardized (mostly)) they tell a story across time. And time-evolving stories are what paleontologists get into!

What I found, aka TLDR

• The museum was in a bad place before 2011, thus their move to Drexel
• The financial damage accrued before Covid (the latter did no favors, but the financially untenable infrastructure was securely in place)
• All financial indicators were going the wrong way, most destructively the pledge pipeline (aka the money coming in for the future), which was $4.6M in 2015 and only $333k in 2025. Without a direct government backer/line item in a budget, I don't see how they can get out of this cycle
• Drexel recently (FY 2024-25) spent $8+ million annually on an affiliate rather than something they owned. Considering their own financial challenges, that wasn't sustainable
• Well over $100 million would be needed to endow the museum to full self-sufficiency (especially at the 7% the ANS has on the books as an authorized endowment spending rule); that isn't happening by September 30th
• This was predictable 10+ years ago (admittedly easy to type as a Wednesday morning quarterback)
• Museums can never take their eye off raising endowment money. Ever!

Closing the museum is the right decision for either Board (Drexel/ANS). That doesn't mean it was the only possible choice, of course, but the world runs on money, and they are in a bad, bad place. Maintaining the current FY 2025 requires Drexel to spend $8.3M, and that still leaves an operating deficit. To save the public-facing component of the museum *at its current scale* requires someone to endow it; depending on how conservative or aggressive you think you can grow the endowment, but at least 100M to get started. Or someone pledges $4+M a year in perpetuity, which is what Drexel had effectively been doing (double+ that, actually), and Drexel can't continue that pace considering its own finances. That is my conclusion from looking at 15 years of publicly filed audited statements (in nonprofit work on my branch paper...) that show a financially deteriorating museum.

The Academy seems to have been committing a no-no in the non-profit world, burning its balance sheet to stay open. Operating cash fell from $8.1M to $203K, and capital spending is running at a paltry seventeen cents for every dollar the building depreciated (meaning repairs will fall behind, maintenance will suffer, the building will slowly die).

The "pledge pipeline," in my opinion, is the best forward-looking indicator of any nonprofit, and it fell 93% in 10 years. Unless it started with a bluebird (a whale of a donation that never repeated), this is indicative of an ouroboros, an entity literally consuming itself.

Closing the museum does not save the Academy as a whole, as only 27 of 80 staff are affected, and the building, utilities, security, and collections care costs remain. This makes me worry about the ~19-million-specimen collection and the cool research they conduct. With public land specimens involved, this gets even more complicated, which is why Drexel, the Academy board, and the offices of the governor and the mayor are involved. I predict the Pennsylvania government has to get involved to save it in both the short and long term. Even then, Drexel will have to add its own folks with real day-to-day power, and everyone will have to develop a sustainable financial model to do so. In my experience, this path can work, but personalities will be key. One side comes and declares the other side is the problem, and the new folks are the heroes; well, that just ends painfully for all.

Regarding Covid, as I'm sure that will be stated as a cause, the numbers, to me, suggest it wasn't involved, at least not in the way it might be spun, as $21.4M of the accumulated operating deficit was built before Covid. I'm now curious to look back at other struggling venues to see if this is the case. I know one for sure, and I suspect it likely is. The finance team always knows, but they tend not to be vocal like the sales team (and they love to say they'll save the day, eternal optimists they are :-)).

Another item to note early on in my ramblings: the museum effectively has no debt to wipe out. I went in presuming I'd find some festering mass of ugliness, only to find it was extremely clean debt-wise. Well done!

Liabilities at June 30, 2025
Accounts payable $378,000 (nothing can be done here)
Accrued liabilities $666k (wages and expenses)
Deferred revenue $677k (prepaid memberships)
Line of credit with Drexel is $2.4M at 2%
Operating lease liability: $4,000 
Total liabilities: $4.1M

They paid $38k in interest in 2025.

They borrowed three times from the financials I looked at back to 2011: $900k on a 5-year term loan from Drexel at a stunning .75% rate, repaid in full in 2017.

Revolving line of credit at $2.4M at 2%, another good number

The Paycheck Protection Program loan was forgiven for its entire amount of $1,610,425

I found no disclosed bond debt or external bank debt from FY 2013-25 audits. That is quite impressive. 

What all of the above Finance-ese means is that if I wrote a check to make all of their liabilities disappear from the balance sheet, ANS would save ~$38k a year in interest and get $2.4M in relief, which is less than what Drexel has been subsidizing every ~100 days. Thus, there is no "debt forgiveness" to fix the issue, something governments could conceivably do. The issue is the recurring operating gap, not the entity's capital structure. This makes things much tougher to fix.

One other note: the ANS had a net pension liability of $10.4M on June 30, 2020, and had to spend actual dollars: $1.40M in FY 2020, $1.78M in FY 2021, $1.34M in FY 2022, and $2.73M in FY 2023 of employer contributions. This totaled about $7.3M over 4 years, likely using money they couldn't afford to spend. However, in a twist that can happen in finance, rising discount rates inverted the issue, and the plan was overfunded: $16.5M in assets against $14.7M obligations. Side note: the terminated plan's surplus doesn't come back as cash without excise tax unless rolled into a replacement plan, so the $1.8M "asset" gained by closing it is worth much less at the Academy. Nevertheless, both boards approved terminating it effective around February 28, 2026.

Math

Part of the reason I love paleo is I can say "+/-2 million years," and no one bats an eye. Alas, we can't do that in the real world. Here is how the math "maths" to try and save it. It gives one a sense of the magnitude of the problem.

Option 1: Endow the entirety of the Academy to monetary self-sufficiency
Replacing the Drexel operating support of $8.3M (really $8.9M, as they recorded a $605k operating deficit in 2025) would require $178M at a 5% draw. At a 4.5% draw, that is $198M. Plus a one-time $15-25M to recapitalize deferred items such as exhibits. This is a hypothetical number, as I couldn't find any capital-needs assessments, facilities-condition reports, exhibit-renewal plans, or deferred-maintenance schedules in the Forms 990 or financial statements. That number is based on my experience and might be way too low (or high), as I don't know the state of the facilities.

This means someone would need to come up with $193-223 million, basically this week. I don't see that happening, short of a government intervention.

Option 2: Endow only the public museum to monetary self-sufficiency
The filings don't provide a "museum-only" P&L; thus, the best I could do is use FY 2025's public-education program as a proxy, which cost $7.7M and generated $3M, leaving me with a net program cost of $4.7M (before identifying which costs actually disappear in a closure). Endowing this at 5% means roughly $139-165M. Again, by this week, more or less. I don't see this smaller, but still substantial, windfall coming.

Option 3: Term operating pledge

This is sort of what has happened since 2011. The museum would need a firmly committed $4M/year for 10 years, creating $40M in cash commitments. This keeps things running like a flat-spotted tire for the next 10 years. I suspect this was what Drexel had in mind in doing the 2011 deal: that ANS and/or Drexel would provide additional donor contributions. That didn't work out, and I suspect we'll be in the same place in 10 years without government intervention. Why? Here is what they actually raise per their filing documents.

Total contributions in FY 2025: $2.9M. The problem here is that endowment and other non-operating gifts were only $741K. It showed Drexel support as other income of $8.3M.

New endowment gifts from FY 2014-25 totaled about $14.2M, averaging about $1.2M a year. The best single year was FY 2015 at $5.7M, 40% of a twelve-year run in one year! Add in FY 2016, and those two years are 62% of twelve years of endowment gifts. While FY 2017-21 is less than $1.4M across 5 years. To reach, say, a $178M endowment, at those rates and counting the existing endowment, will take ~84 years (ignoring investment returns, inflation, and spending adjustments/changes).

The existing endowment is $78.3M. Option 1 means roughly tripling it. Option 2 means increasing it by 70-130%. When it has been going backward...

Rescuing the museum is a 9-figure capital campaign for an institution whose pledge pipeline currently contains $333K in money donors have actually promised. And how much of that money will go away in the next few days as the bad press causes people to rethink their dollar contributions?

I have heard that Drexel has a massive endowment. Alas, it doesn't in the grand scheme of things. Drexel has a $1.1B endowment (as of FY 2025), which works out to be about $54k per student. For comparison, the University of Pennsylvania (~10,000 feet away) has ~$884k per student ($24.8B). Drexel is tuition-dependent while Penn is, well, wealthy. 

More salient in this conundrum is that Drexel's endowment is 67% donor-restricted, which cannot be redirected. Drexel’s FY 2025 audited statements disclose a board-designated endowment, meaning the portion the board can actually choose to spend, of $371,945,000 as of June 30, 2025 (which isn't liquid cash, thus not easy to spend). So, mathematically, I suppose they have the funds to save it. However...

Permanently endowing the Academy with, say, $178M would consume ~48% of Drexel’s entire discretionary endowment, forever, for what to them is, in the grand scheme of things, a small subsidiary museum. Even if they wanted to, Drexel is projected to run deficits through FY 2028 and will want every last penny available to tend to its own wounds.

Moody's downgraded Drexel in April 2026, stating that supplemental endowment draws would support operations and naming financial policy and management as a governance consideration and a key driver of the downgrade. I read this as Drexel is spending more than it should from buckets it'd rather not be spending from.

Moody’s reported Drexel had total outstanding debt of $552M (bonds payable) when it affirmed the A3 rating in February 2022. In March 2026, the PHEFA authorized up to $120M of Drexel revenue-refunding bonds to refinance or restructure existing debt and near-term principal payments. That is liability management, not new operating revenue. Thus, they need to raise money.

Drexel had a $63M loss in FY 2024, ~$40M in FY 2025, and seems to be projecting a $20M loss in FY 2026. They had sixty layoffs, over 150 buyouts (these are from local news sources; I didn't see any audit report on this), and suspended employer 403(b) retirement contributions for calendar year 2025 (FY = Fiscal year and rarely matches the calendar year that we humans run our lives on :-)). This is not great for Drexel.

Drexel gave the Academy ~$72M (or $86M in June 2025 dollars) over the last 13 years, money some likely wish had been spent elsewhere.

Asking Drexel, with downgraded credit and employees taking real financial hits, to permanently commit nearly half of its discretionary endowment to fix another institution's structural revenue deficit, one that isn't part of its core mission, isn't going to happen, no matter how much Drexel's leadership loves dinosaurs. A government intervention can help, partnering with Drexel to manage the day-to-day. The government looks good, Drexel gets control of an asset, and ANS lives.

Covid Impact

I'm sure the Academy will blame Covid in part; it is too convenient a scapegoat. I can hear folks saying, "Covid crippled attendance, this permanently changed visitation rates, and our audience has moved on." Mix in "Our operating costs have risen!" The great thing about being a researcher is that I hear these anecdotes as testable hypotheses. As a 501(c)(3), they have to publish a Form 990, and we can look at the numbers therein. Let's see what they say.

Accumulated unrestricted operating deficit	Balance	Change
FY 2013	-$7.3M	Baseline
FY 2016	-$13.1M	-6M
FY 2017	-15.1M	-2M
FY 2018	-17.5M	-2M
FY 2019 (last pre-Covid)	-21.4M	-3.9M
FY 2020 (first Covid)	-24.6M	-3.2M
FY 2021	-22M	+2.6M
FY 2022	-21.4M	+600K
FY 2023	-20.4M	+1M
FY 2024	-20.2M	+200K
FY 2025 (pension liability unwinding is in here)	-$19.1M	+1.1M

The Academy's deficit was already $21.4M before Covid. Covid added ~$3M in FY 2020, and pension accounting is masking the losses from 2021 onward, I believe. The accumulated unrestricted operating deficit worsened by $14M, as noted above in the table. This is all years before the pandemic.

FY 2019 (last pre-Covid), ended June 30, 2019, these numbers have no pandemic impact and were the largest Form 990 shortfall I found in FY 2011-25.

Revenue $15,561,542

Expenses $21,149,181

Loss of $5,587,639

Covid did not create the structural imbalance, which was already substantial by FY2019. It certainly didn't help, but the systemic issues were thoroughly entrenched.

What do admissions say?

Fiscal Year	Museum Admissions	Notes
FY 2014	$1.5M	Peak
FY 2015	$1.1M	-28%
FY 2016	$1.1M
FY 2017	$1.4M	A bump!
FY 2018	$1.1M
FY 2024	$1.07M	Down 47% after CPI from 2014

The table shows that admissions revenue fell 26% nominally, or ~30% after CPI-U adjustment, between the pre-pandemic years of FY 2014 and FY 2018. FWIW, A 2025 American Alliance of Museums survey noted more than 50% of US museums had not returned to pre-pandemic attendance. The Academy likely hasn't either.

What the pandemic and the failure to return to pre-pandemic visitation levels did do, though, was remove their last hope. Executives can say, "If the pandemic hadn't happened, then people would have attended in greater numbers." The ol' negative evidence argument sounds plausible, but I don't think it would have happened, given pre-pandemic numbers and the fact that, aside from a spike (was there a special exhibit that year?), the numbers were flat to down.

Regarding rising operating cost claims, their total operating expenses (in constant June 2025 dollars) were ~$21M in FY 2011 and $23M in FY 2025. The Form 990 showed expenses were 10% higher than 2011 levels (after CPI-U adjustment, and they used calendar vs FY back in 2011, fwiw). I don't know if anyone has made the "costs gone up" argument, but I hear it enough at other places that I figured I'd look it up while I had the books open.

Death Spiral

Spiral 1 happened when the endowment went from $48.6M on June 30, 2013 to $78.3M on June 30, 2025. "But BC, that looks like growth!" However, only $14.2M of new gifts went in over those 12 years. Adjusted for inflation, the starting money plus the new money would be worth ~$84M in 2025 dollars. Yet the endowment is worth $78.3M, meaning it lost ~8% of its real, gift-adjusted purchasing power. This may have happened because the annual cash payout exceeded what the portfolio could sustainably fund.

Spiral 2 happened when the ANS had to spend money (the "principal") to keep things going, which meant less real income, which widens the gap, which requires a bigger
drawdown. Which means less real income, which further widens the gap, and so on... The annual payout rose from $2.77M in FY 2014 to $4.22M in FY 2025, a 52%
increase, while the corpus grew 46% (using FY 2014). The Board moved the spending rule to 7% of a 7-year trailing average in FY 2021 and has kept it there. It was 6.5% in FY 2014-7, 5.5% in FY 2018-19, 6% in FY 2020, 7% in 2021+. The rates were cut when cash was flush and raised as the cash ran out.

Spiral 3 happened when operating cash began to be spent. Operating cash on June 30, 2018, was $8.14M, down to $2.3M in FY 2019. By FY 2020, it was $462K; FY 2021 twas $664K; and it was $0 FY 2022. FY 2023 was $919K, FY 2024 was $213K, and FY 2025 was $203K. The line of credit was at $0 in FY 2018 and $3.5M as of June 30, 2024. The line has a covenant requiring the balance to reach 0 and stay there for thirty consecutive days each term, or it defaults and terminates. A lifeline, but one that can strangle if it isn't paid off.

Spiral 4 happened when they had low capital additions relative to depreciation, degrading the museum and the experience (though having not been, I don't know if this happened). Capital spending was $304K in FY 2024, and $221K in FY 2025, against a depreciation of $1.25M and $1.27M. 17-24 cents of reinvestment per dollar of wear doesn't fix much. Accumulated depreciation is now 53% of the gross plant cost. A "lesser" visitor experience leads to lower attendance (word of mouth plus they won't personally go again), which means lower earned revenue and accelerates the spiral.

Spiral 5 happened when they began cutting fundraising capacity to save money. This destroys future revenue and, in my experience, is the true beginning of the end. Their fundraising expenses fell from $1.34M in FY 2024 to $1.1M in FY 2025, 18% to the department that provides the only hope you have to "sell your way out" of the revenue jam. It is hard to find donors when you aren't out looking. Full disclosure, that $200k could have been because of a big conference/expense the prior year; I didn't dig for years to see, as the need to write about sauropods began gnawing harder. I just see that fundraising is "easy" to cut on the front end, but without a dedicated fundraising strategy (or a government line item), fundraising is the only hope.

Spiral 6 happened when the outstanding unconditional pledges at year-end (some call this the "pledge pipeline," and I like the alliteration) collapsed, which one can see in contributions receivable, aka money donors formally promised but haven't paid. This went from $4.6M in FY 2015 to $3.2M, $3.3M, $2.3M, $1.6M, $999K, $1.2M, $822K, $916K, $858K, and $333K in FY 2025. A 93% decline. I don't know the industry standard, but a 93% decline in my income would be disastrous. One note: this doesn't measure annual fundraising or prove a 93% collapse in donor support, since the money could have been collected already, for instance, but I think it is directionally correct.

Spiral 7 happened with illiquidity. 54% of the $78.7M portfolio is priced at net asset value rather than market value, including $23.9M of closed-end private equity that cannot be redeemed. Unfunded capital commitments total $9.6M against $1.5M of financial assets the Academy says it can access within a year. Capital calls must be met, and without cash, selling something is on the table. What do they have? Did they ever consider any "old tyme" privately owned or privately donated specimens in today's hot fossil market? Would the public have been ok if ANS had one or two fossils they could have sold privately to create an "instant endowment," like the Museum of Ancient Life did when they sold their Ceratosaurus to a dealer? Is it better to keep the museum open at the cost of a few specimens (of course presuming the underlying issues that got them here in the first place have been addressed)? Who are the fossils for? Research? Mounting them removes them from the 'researchers' realm. The public? Clearly the public wasn't flocking to see any original specimens on display. It is a thorny issue that I'll wax a tad more about at the end of this blog.

Spiral 8 happened when the visible distress killed any shot at major gifts transpiring. I believe there is a near-zero chance someone will endow a chair for a museum that might close soon. Cutting hours down to Friday-Sunday in October of 2025 was quite public, and certainly looks terminal to most outsiders, for why would a major museum be open only 3 days/week? Once hours are cut, fundraising gets much, much tougher.

And that is the center of the spiral, the end of the museum. If someone tried to rescue it in a hurry, only the $193-223 million number would work. Otherwise, it is simply postponing the inevitable. Unless Option 2 comes with lots of upgrades and successful plans happen. Or a Governor reprieve. Hope dies last, but it does die.

Fun Facts I Observed

1. Operating cash fell from $8,147,374 in FY 2018 to $203,000 in FY 2025, a 98% fall.
2. The pledge pipeline (money donors formally promise) fell from $4,608,715 in FY 2015 to $333,000 in FY 2025.
3. In FY 2025, the Academy spent $221K on "Purchase of buildings and equipment," which was 17% of that year's $1.3M depreciation charge. This means capital renewal is low relative to depreciation, which is not good, but since the filings don't separately disclose maintenance spending or provide a facilities-condition backing, it must be considered "directionally correct." 
4. Accumulated depreciation is 53% of the gross cost of the buildings and equipment.
5. Museum admissions have never exceeded ~$1.5M from FY 2011-2025. In FY 2025, the public-education program reported $3M of revenue versus $7.7M of expenses. The museum has never paid for itself, before or after Drexel. This isn't unusual, but without actual governmental buy-in, it isn't sustainable, which is why so many museums are run by local governments. I'm surprised it lasted as long as it did.
6. FY 2019, which contains no pandemic numbers at all, produced a $5,587,639 loss on the Form 990, the worst year in the series.
7. Drexel suspended employer 403(b) retirement contributions for calendar year 2025. Academy staff took a retirement pay cut a year before the museum closed.
   
8. They reported holding $110.2M in assets. They claimed they could spend $1.46M within a year "to meet cash needs for general expenditure," apart from operating revenue, grants, admissions, memberships, authorized endowment payout, and expected Drexel support. That sounds like a lot, but there is much that needs doing, so either one department would "win," or everyone would "go skinny." I suspect each department has been running lean for years.
   
9. The 990 filed in May 2026 reported FY 2025 revenue of $25.8M against expenses of $23.8M, a $2M surplus, which made the last full year look financially fine, unless you read the audited statement that showed a $605k operating deficit.

Woulda, Coulda, Shoulda

1. A full merger with Drexel in 2011 instead of the affiliation route would have at least made this problem part of a larger ecosystem (Drexel's). In 2011, the deal seems to have been structured to hand Drexel the deficit while leaving cost control with the separate Academy board. A cynic would say Drexel became a wallet, with no ability to restructure anything. This isn't entirely true, as the Academy remained a separate nonprofit with its own board. Still, Drexel was the Academy's sole voting member, approved its budget and trustees, designated 5 trustees, supervised the Academy president, and had approval rights over major transactions and dissolution. Yet, from what I can see, it didn't have day-to-day control, but rather a shared and layered governance. Contrast that with what seems to be happening at Temple University with the Library Company of Philadelphia, wherein the library will be subsumed. Had a full merger happened 15 years ago, I think we'd be in a different situation.

2. When the accumulated deficit hit $13M in 2016, why not pivot to becoming a research institute with limited public access? It is effectively what they are doing now (before this new plan I am only now hearing about), but back then the donor base was alive, and the deficit would be roughly $11M lower than the FY 2020 trough. It would have been awful, for sure, but with a much better chance to survive than what has come to pass. 

3. Gephart described the location in 2011 as one of the best half-city blocks in Philadelphia. Can they monetize the real estate today? Drexel operates Academic Properties Inc., which seems to develop real estate. A ground lease or partial development of a Benjamin Franklin Parkway parcel might generate some revenue. I looked but didn't see any notes exploring unlocking real estate as a savior plan. Maybe they still can? There would likely be many legal and donor restrictions to address; it's certainly worth exploring.

4. Though it is probably too late, maybe they can work a deal with Penn, Temple, Drexel, the Commonwealth (I love that name!), or even the Feds to share the cost of the collection? I worry if they don't do something like this, the irreplaceable collection is at risk. Few museums can acquire such a massive collection on their own, but a group working together could.

5. Another, probably too late to do, but could they merge operations with another Parkway museum? Shared ticketing, marketing, facilities, security, retail, and back office with the Franklin Institute or another venue could work. It doesn't look like any of Philadelphia’s museums have ever consolidated administration. With management and general expenses at the Academy running 22-24% of costs, ~$5.4M a year, there could be some serious savings. It is why companies merge, then fire half of accounting and HR and make the survivors work harder, more revenue at less cost. However, allocations, stranded costs, already-shared Drexel services, and merger costs themselves (it isn't cheap to merge) would impact the initial value. This is an "over time" play and doesn't help today.

6. Reported Academy royalty revenue was $144k in FY 2014; the FY 2025 audit reported $26k of royalties and $13k of Vireo rights. For a 19-million-specimen collection, a world-class library, and a famous dinosaur hall, that is functionally 0 dollars. I know Fossil Crates would love to create traveling exhibits and license casts to sell. Does ANS have 3D facilities that can do fee-for-scan projects for other museums? Granted, it might not have generated enough money at the outset, but I am seeing savvy museums monetizing specimens on their shelves via casting rights. A research collection can generate real income without deaccessioning a single specimen. Fossil Crates isn't unique in paying a royalty on the items we sell to help museums monetize otherwise illiquid assets while sharing amazing specimens with the world.

Miscellaneous Thoughts

This is an emotional topic. Museums are among the most trusted purveyors of truth in our society. We go there to muse (it is literally in the name!), to learn, contemplate, and enjoy in nonprofit families. Museums are important to society as a whole. The passionate outcry demonstrates this. Many of those outcries made the points below, each of which I could test to some capacity.

"Drexel abandoned the Academy"

Drexel paid no money to acquire the Academy, as it was an affiliation, not a purchase or merger. I assume Drexel treated it as a controlled, consolidated nonprofit subsidiary. I did not find any purchase consideration disclosed in the audited statements. The Academy retained its separate legal status, board, and segregated endowment. Over 13 years, Drexel spent ~$85.6M (in June 2025 dollars), ranging from $4-$8.9M each year. I found nothing in the reports showing that the Academy transferred any endowment to Drexel. The endowment remained separately reported and dedicated entirely to the Academy. Only authorized payments funded Academy operations. The Academy remained a separate nonprofit with its own board, but control was shared, and Drexel held substantial reserved powers. Yet Drexel didn't have day-to-day capabilities to influence, just giant stick "budget denied" powers. Trying to hit a fly with a wrecking ball kind of powers, it seems. If they had more control, then one could point the finger at them much more.

"Drexel raided the Endowment"

Not from what I can tell. The endowment went from $48.6M to $78.3M under the Drexel affiliation and remains 98% donor-restricted, with only $1.7M board-designated. The Academy's board of trustees set the 7% spending rule and disclosed it in every audit. 

"Covid killed the Academy"

Nope. By June 30, 2013, the Academy reported a -$7.3M accumulated operating balance. By June 30, 2019, before Covid, it had plummeted to -$21.4M, a drop of $14.1M more. By June 30, 2025, it had improved to -$19.1M. Covid likely both damaged attendance and complicated the recovery, but it did not create the Academy’s underlying structural imbalance; the audited record shows that the imbalance was substantial years before the pandemic.

"Federal Funding cuts killed the Academy"
Not from what I can tell. Federal grants and contracts did go down .8%. $1.86M in FY 2024 and $1.85M in FY 2025. State grants were $443K, then $380K. The Academy cited federal funding cuts in its October 2025 hours-reduction announcement, but the audited numbers don't reflect that. Maybe we'll see the numbers in a 2026 filing.

"Executive salaries drained it"
As much as I'd like to say, "YES!" the total executive compensation reported on the 990 was $1,470,966 in FY 2025. Zeroing out every executive salary covers less than a fifth of the annual gap. Yes, it looks bad, and I'm scratching my head as to how it happened, but that wouldn't have saved the Academy. You could also say some people earn every last penny; they get paid so much because they know exactly what to do to make the business flourish, and I suspect many of the higher-paid folks had solid reputations as "doers." Someone has to be in the chair; alas, there is no guarantee they'll succeed.

"They are selling off the collections"
Nope, that isn't happening. The Academy does not recognize its collections as balance-sheet assets. The Academy’s deaccession policy states that proceeds from any sale of collection material must be returned to the department the material came from and used only to acquire new material or upgrade the condition of existing collections (Click here to read about how museums legally sell fossils). They legally can't sell anything from federal lands. 

"The city, the state, and the foundations did nothing"
I didn't see any state or city operating appropriation anywhere in the revenue
record across 13 years. The governor and mayor engaged only in 2025 and 2026, after 15 years of public filings that showed trouble if anyone looked. The filings don't disclose individual donors, and I can't blame people if they chose to walk away from foundations as things looked grimmer and grimmer; they could give their money to another museum they could help flourish.

What can be done still?

From what I can tell, saving the museum isn't an option without a Governor's Phone Call and a plan to fix the underlying challenges. But saving the collections, that is still on the table!

Title to the collections

The Academy is a separate Pennsylvania nonprofit and holds title. Drexel asked for the collections in a merger in April 2026 and did not get them. Nothing about the pending
term sheet is public, but scientifically everything rides on the collections. If Drexel has title, it would make me feel much better about their long-term ability to stay together.

A binding public-access commitment

Closing a museum is not the same as closing access. Guaranteed researcher access, loan policy, digitization commitments, and a public-display obligation can all be written into a governance agreement, but it has to happen right now.

Pennsylvania Attorney General involvement

Donor-restricted charitable assets sit under the Attorney General’s oversight, AFAIK, with Orphans’ Court jurisdiction depending on the asset and proposed transaction. If you are worried about the collections, I'd start looking to the AG, not Drexel.

A call for collections care

The Academy can still legally accept money for its collections, acquisition, and direct care. I don't know if there is public will on that front, but that'd be the place to put money right now to secure the safety of the collections (at least until Drexel takes title, presuming they do...).

The FY 2026 audit (around late October 2026)

It may disclose the closure costs, the pension termination outcome, and whether the credit line covenant was satisfied. Make sure to demand that it be shared publicly!

Conclusion

The audited 990 filings establish that the Academy’s structural operating imbalance existed years before Covid, that FY 2025 operations depended on $8+M of Drexel support, and that the Academy recorded a $605K operating deficit. Historical private fundraising suggests ANS is unlikely to replace Drexel's support anytime soon. In my view, keeping the museum open will require what I'd dub "durable public funding" (aka the government), or a similar "durable" commitment from multiple institutions (more than an affiliation), or a stunning private source. If any of those happened, it would also need a credible long-term operating plan.

Barring a stay of execution from the Governor, the museum will close. The amount of money required to keep it as it is, barring a miracle donor or group of large donors, won't materialize.

The collections have me concerned. Even if Drexel legally takes title to them, it has its own financial challenges, so where will the money come from? Will the public be excited about funding a resource they can't see? Sure, there will be short-term fury until the next headline comes along. Will enough folks stick it out until the funds are secured to save the collection?

Which leads me to the meta question that occupies more and more of my thoughts... Who are the fossils even for? What are they for? Mounting original bones prevents their study; they become commercial specimens used to inspire (code for generating revenue), as the paint and plaster obscure their scientific secrets. If the bones were truly about research, they'd never be mounted, or they'd be CT scanned before mounting (plus 3D scanned before plastering, photographed, videotaped, and even scored in a matrix). That doesn't (yet) happen at any museum. Museums use original bones as prestige for the museum (to get more money from donors), though I admit hearing the "oooohs" and "aaaahs" while I'm on a ladder trying to study a sauropod is immensely gratifying. They like to say the public likes real bones, I'd say if the public knew mounting real bones (yeah, the bones mechanically can be removed, but try getting a sauropod dorsal column or pelvis off display...) meant they couldn't be studied, but if the real bones were under a dynamic plastic mount that let them see exactly what was "real" and what is cast, I think 99% would say do that.

I hope ANS gets a reprieve, but the financials indicate massive challenges that need fixing. If the government backs it, there will be time and funds to make the changes needed to flourish. It is clear the public loves museums, and anything the public loves looks good for politicians (plus they have children and grandchildren who love dinosaurs; they don't want to be the one to explain at Thanksgiving why they let the dinosaur museum close). 

Thank you kindly for reading! 

BC

Started 9/2/2026, completed 9/3/2026: 17 hours total

PS. Some useful links:

Historical audited statements

FY2025 audited financial statements

Signed FY2025 Form 990

Original FY2019 Form 990 filed with the IRS

Official September 1 announcement

September 2 leadership announcement

PPS. This blog isn't hosted on a purpose-built blog site. As such, all comments are automatically held. Any links, images, non-family-friendly words and the like will not be posted. Responses may take much longer than you'd like; there are a lot of sauropods to describe, and I have to make up for the 14 hours I spent on this :-).